By Johnathan Hettinger, Midwest Center for Investigative Reporting

This story is supported with a grant from the Fund for Investigative Journalism.

Get poisoned or get on board.

That’s the selection soybean farmers similar to Will Glazik face. The previous few summers, farmers close to Glazik’s central Illinois farm have sprayed a lot of the weed killer dicamba on the similar time that it has polluted the air for hours and generally days.

As Glazik places it, there are two forms of soybeans: Monsanto’s, that are genetically engineered to face up to dicamba, and everybody else’s.

Glazik’s soybeans have been the broken ones. His soybean leaves will curl up; then the crops will turn out to be smaller and weaker. He’s misplaced as a lot as 40 bushels an acre in some fields, an enormous loss when natural soybeans are $20 a bushel. He has to maintain his breath yearly to see if the injury will trigger him to lose his natural certification.

His neighbors who spray dicamba are annoyed with him, he mentioned. There’s a simple answer to keep away from injury, they inform him: Buy Monsanto’s seeds.

Monsanto’s Dicamba-Tolerant Crop Rollout

close up of oak tree branches
An oak tree displays signs of injury from dicamba documented by the Illinois Department of Natural Resources. Midwest Center for Investigative Reporting.

This actuality is what Monsanto was counting on when it launched dicamba-tolerant crops, an investigation by the Midwest Center for Investigative Reporting discovered.

Monsanto’s new system was supposed to be the way forward for farming, offering farmers with a collection of seeds and chemical compounds that would fight an increasing number of weeds that had been changing into tougher to kill.

Instead, the system’s rollout has led to hundreds of thousands of acres of crop injury throughout the Midwest and South; widespread tree demise in lots of rural communities, state parks, and nature preserves; and an unprecedented stage of strife within the farming world.

Executives from Monsanto and BASF, a German chemical firm that labored with Monsanto to launch the system, knew their dicamba weed killers would trigger large-scale injury to fields throughout the United States however determined to push them on unsuspecting farmers anyway, in a bid to nook the soybean and cotton markets.

Monsanto and BASF have denied for years that dicamba is answerable for injury, blaming farmers making unlawful purposes, climate occasions, and illness. The firms insist that when utilized in accordance to the label, dicamba stays on goal and is an efficient software for farmers.

The Monsanto-Dicamba Investigation

Over the previous yr, the Midwest Center reviewed hundreds of pages of presidency and inner firm paperwork launched via lawsuits, sat within the courtroom for weeks of deliberation, interviewed farmers affected by dicamba, and weed scientists coping with the problem up shut. This story gives essentially the most complete image of what Monsanto and BASF knew about dicamba’s propensity to hurt farmers’ livelihoods and the surroundings earlier than releasing the weed killer.

The investigation discovered:

Ignoring Warnings

Monsanto and BASF launched their merchandise figuring out that dicamba would trigger widespread injury to soybean and cotton crops that weren’t resistant to dicamba. They used “protection from your neighbors” as a approach to promote extra of their merchandise. In doing so, the businesses ignored years of warnings from impartial teachers, specialty crop growers, and their very own workers.

Limited Testing

Monsanto restricted testing that would doubtlessly delay or deny regulatory approval of dicamba. For years, Monsanto struggled to hold dicamba from drifting in its personal assessments. In regulatory assessments submitted to the EPA, the corporate sprayed the product in places and beneath climate situations that didn’t mirror how farmers would truly spray it. Midway via the approval course of, with the EPA paying shut consideration, the corporate determined to cease its researchers from conducting assessments.

Questionable Impact

Even after submitting knowledge that the EPA used to approve dicamba in 2016, Monsanto scientists knew that many questions remained. The firm’s personal analysis confirmed dicamba combined with different herbicides was extra possible to trigger injury. The firm additionally prevented impartial scientists from conducting their very own assessments and declined to pay for research that might doubtlessly give them extra details about dicamba’s real-world impression.

Avoiding Liability

Although marketed as serving to out clients, the businesses’ investigations of drift incidents had been designed to restrict their legal responsibility, discover different causes for the injury, and by no means finish with payouts to farmers. For instance, BASF advised pesticide applicators that generally it isn’t secure to spray even when following the label to the letter, putting legal responsibility squarely on the applicators.

Working Together

The two firms had been in lockstep for years. Executives from Monsanto and BASF met at the very least 19 instances from 2010 on to focus on the dicamba-tolerant cropping system, together with working collectively on the event of the know-how, reaching regulatory approval for the crops and herbicides, and the commercialization of crops.

Illegal Applications

Monsanto launched seeds resistant to dicamba in 2015 and 2016 with out an accompanying weed killer, figuring out that off-label spraying of dicamba, which is unlawful, could be “rampant.” At the identical time, BASF ramped up manufacturing of older variations of dicamba that had been unlawful to apply to the crops and made tens of hundreds of thousands of promoting the older variations, which had been extra possible to trigger transfer off of the place they had been utilized.

Monsanto & BASF Company Statements

monsanto signage outside of facility
A Monsanto facility in Jerseyville, Illinois, in 2015. Monsanto, which was bought by Bayer in 2018, launched the dicamba-tolerant crops, starting in 2015. Midwest Center for Investigative Reporting.

Bayer, which purchased Monsanto in 2018, refused to grant an interview with the Midwest Center. Company officers didn’t reply to requests for remark, as an alternative issuing a press release.

Spokesman Kyel Richard mentioned the corporate “has seen an outpouring of support from grower organizations and our customers.”

“We continue to stand with the thousands of farmers who rely on this technology as part of their integrated weed management program,” Richard mentioned.

BASF additionally didn’t reply to requests for remark, as an alternative issuing a press release.

BASF spokeswoman Odessa Patricia Hines mentioned that the corporate’s model of dicamba has “different physical properties and compositions” than Monsanto’s. Hines mentioned the corporate is continuous to enhance its dicamba know-how.

A federal courtroom banned the herbicide in spring of 2020, however the EPA reinstated dicamba for 5 extra years in October of that very same yr.

Bader Farms & Other Legal Complaints

owners of bader farms bill and denise bader
Bill and Denise Bader, house owners of Bader Farms, pose in entrance of the Rush Hudson Limbaugh Sr. United States Courthouse in Cape Girardeau, Missouri, on Jan. 27, 2020. Midwest Center for Investigative Reporting file photograph.

In 2020, a federal jury sided with a Missouri peach farmer who sued the businesses for driving his orchard out of enterprise. The jury awarded Bill Bader $15 million for his losses and $250 million in punitive damages designed to punish Bayer. Bayer and BASF are interesting the decision. The punitive damages had been later diminished to $60 million.

Hines of BASF identified that within the Missouri trial: “The jury’s verdict found that only Monsanto’s conduct warranted punitive damages.”

Following the trial, Bayer introduced a $400 million settlement with farmers harmed by dicamba, together with $300 million to soybean farmers. Bayer mentioned they count on BASF to pay for a part of the settlement.

An lawyer for Bader referred to as the businesses’ conduct “a conspiracy to create an ecological disaster in order to increase their profits” in courtroom filings. The case largely revolved round displaying the businesses knew dicamba would hurt hundreds of farmers.

According to courtroom displays, in October 2015, Monsanto projected it might obtain practically 2,800 complaints from farmers in the course of the 2017 rising season, a determine primarily based on one-in-ten farmers having a grievance.

However, even one Monsanto govt knew these projections may be low, in accordance to courtroom data. In late August 2016, Boyd Carey, a PhD crop scientist overseeing the claims course of for Monsanto, realized it may be extra like one-in-five and requested for a funds improve from $2.four million to $6.5 million to examine claims. Carey testified that he was awarded the rise.

The projected variety of complaints rose to greater than three,200 for 2018, earlier than happening. After 2018, Monsanto figured that fewer farmers could be harmed as a result of extra farmers would swap to Monsanto’s crops to keep away from being broken, Carey testified within the Bader trial.

Delaying the Inevitable

Dicamba impacts all components of Glazik’s operation. He grows natural soybeans to keep away from publicity to poisonous pesticides. He additionally likes the upper premiums and the improved soil high quality. But with dicamba within the air, he’s much less possible to achieve success.

He now has to plant his soybeans later annually. Soybeans are much less possible to be severely broken after they’re small, and planting them later than standard means they’ll be smaller when the inevitable cloud of weed killer envelops his crops. Later planting sometimes means a little bit of yield loss. It additionally means a later harvest, which limits planting of canopy crops Glazik makes use of to enhance his soil.

“All crop damage aside,” he mentioned, the weed killer is all over the place. Oaks, hickories, and different timber are broken close to his farm, each within the nation and on the town, he mentioned. “The fact is that the chemical can volatilize and move with the wind and in the air. We’re breathing it.”

A ‘Potential Disaster’

soybeans with suspected dicamba damage
Soybeans with suspected dicamba injury north of Flatville, Illinois, on August 21, 2019. Millions of acres of non-dicamba tolerant soybeans have been broken by dicamba. Midwest Center for Investigative Reporting file photograph.

For 20 years, Monsanto made billions of with Roundup Ready crops, which had been genetically engineered to face up to being sprayed by the weed killer and adopted by practically each American soybean farmer. But by the mid-to-late 2000s, Roundup was beginning to fail. Farmers’ fields had been overwhelmed with “superweeds” that had developed resistance to Roundup’s energetic ingredient, glyphosate.

In response, Monsanto developed new soybean and cotton seeds that had been genetically engineered to face up to being sprayed by each glyphosate and dicamba, a really efficient weed killer used because the 1960s. It was additionally touted as the corporate’s largest biotechnology rollout in firm historical past. In simply three years, Monsanto’s dicamba-tolerant system was in a position to seize up to three-fourths of complete soybean acreage, an space the dimensions of Michigan.

Dicamba was not broadly used in the course of the rising season due to its propensity to transfer off-target and hurt different crops. Because of its restricted use, fewer weeds had been resistant to it, making it an efficient substitute for Roundup. Monsanto even dubbed the crops as its money-maker’s next-generation, calling them Roundup Ready 2 Xtend.

But the corporate confronted an issue with dicamba: The weed killer drifted onto non-resistant crops, some so far as miles away. In its personal testing over time, Monsanto had by accident harmed its personal crops dozens of instances.

As far again as 2009, Monsanto and BASF obtained warnings about dicamba from a number of sources — one firm referred to as it a “potential disaster,” in accordance to courtroom data — however they determined to plow forward anyway.

“DON’T DO IT; expect lawsuits,” wrote one Monsanto worker, summarizing educational surveys the corporate commissioned about dicamba’s use.

Dicamba Drift and Volatilization

In order to commercialize dicamba, each Monsanto and BASF labored to develop new formulations with low volatility.

Off-target motion from dicamba can occur in two predominant methods: drift and volatilization. Drift is when the chemical’s particles transfer off the sphere when they’re sprayed, usually by wind within the seconds or minutes after it’s utilized. Volatilization is when dicamba particles flip from a liquid to a fuel within the hours or days after the herbicide is utilized.

Damage from volatilization regularly happens via a course of referred to as “atmospheric loading,” which is when a lot dicamba is sprayed on the similar time that it’s unable to dissipate and persists within the air for hours or days, poisoning no matter it comes into contact with.

Volatilization is especially regarding as a result of dicamba can transfer for miles and hurt non-target crops, particularly soybeans, and even lawns and gardens. Tomatoes, grapes, and different specialty crops are additionally at-risk of being broken.

Despite being touted as much less unstable, the brand new variations — Monsanto’s XtendiMax with VaporGrip Technology and BASF’s Engenia — had been unable to cease the motion totally.

Off-Target Incidents

During its 2012-2014 testing of an older model of XtendiMax, Monsanto had at the very least 73 off-target incidents, in accordance to courtroom paperwork.

In 2014, Monsanto had vital dicamba injury at a coaching facility in Portageville, Missouri. Even in its personal promotional movies, Monsanto couldn’t forestall non-dicamba tolerant soybeans from displaying signs of injury.

The EPA took word of an incident the place, via volatilization, dicamba become a fuel and apparently floated greater than 2 miles away, a lot farther than it was supposed to. During that incident, nobody had measured how badly the crops had been broken, and the EPA was unable to definitively decide the signs had been attributable to dicamba. The EPA determined that was an “uncertainty” and accredited using the weed killer with a 110-foot buffer zone.

In 2015, figuring out the EPA was conserving an eye fixed on off-target motion, Monsanto determined to halt all testing of XtendiMax with VaporGrip Technology. According to courtroom data, it saved its personal workers who had been involved in growing suggestions for farmers from testing. And it restricted trials by impartial teachers so as to preserve a “clean slate.” It requested BASF to halt its dicamba testing as effectively.

When a weed science professor on the University of Arkansas requested Monsanto for somewhat little bit of Xtendimax to check its volatility, the corporate advised him it might have problem producing sufficient dicamba for each him and its impartial assessments.

A Monsanto worker, who labored on the firm for 35 years, didn’t suppose a lot of that clarification when he forwarded the e-mail to a colleague.

“Hahaha difficulty in producing enough product for field testing,” he wrote. “Hahaha bullshit.”

Illegal Spraying a ‘Ticking Time Bomb’

roundup ready soybeans and signage
Dicamba-resistant soybeans in rural McLean County on August 7. 2017. The Roundup Ready 2 Xtend soybeans had been touted as the following technology of glyphosate-resistant soybeans. Midwest Center for Investigative Reporting file photograph.

Weeds minimize into farmers’ earnings. With low revenue margins, farmers will use any software they will to management weeds.

Monsanto acknowledged this in 2015 and 2016 after they launched dicamba-tolerant crops with out their new variations of dicamba. An inner Monsanto slide reveals the corporate knew that many farmers would possible illegally spray older, extra unstable variations and hurt different farmers’ crops.

But the corporate determined the advantages of creating a market share outweighed the dangers and launched the cotton crops in 2015. The EPA allowed farmers to spray different weed killers on the crops, and Monsanto determined to launch the seeds with “a robust communication plan that dicamba cannot be used.”

When the seeds had been bought, Monsanto put a pink sticker on every bag to point out it was unlawful to spray dicamba on the crops in 2015. The firm additionally despatched letters to all growers and retailers, amongst different techniques, to restrict unlawful purposes of dicamba.

However, in inner communications in April 2015, members of Monsanto’s cotton group joked about this dangerous technique.

“One sticker is going to keep us out of jail,” one wrote.

In Oct. 2015, a BASF worker reported listening to that growers sprayed older variations of dicamba on the cotton that yr.

Monsanto doubled down on this dangerous technique in 2016, releasing dicamba-tolerant soybean crops with no weed killer, too. Meanwhile, Monsanto additionally declined to examine drift incidents in 2015 and 2016.

At a February 2016 assembly in Puerto Rico, a BASF govt expressed issues to Monsanto that the “widespread” unlawful spraying would possible turn out to be “rampant” due to the choice.

BASF additionally benefited from Monsanto’s resolution. The firm’s gross sales of older variations of dicamba spiked in 2016. Retailers bought $100 million price of its older variations of the weed killer, in contrast to about $60 million yearly in 2014 and 2015, in accordance to inner paperwork. BASF paperwork indicated the gross sales elevated due to dicamba-tolerant seeds.

In the summer time of 2016, BASF gross sales representatives within the subject had been reporting older variations of dicamba inflicting injury, hinting the issue was predictable.

“The one thing most acres of beans have in common is dicamba damage. There must be a huge cloud of dicamba blanketing the Missouri Bootheel,” a BASF worker wrote in a July four, 2016, report. “That ticking time bomb finally exploded.”

Drift Expected to Drive Sales

tractor harvesting soybean field
iStock.com/BanksPhotos

Dicamba drift led to widespread information protection. Monsanto and BASF anticipated to flip all of it into more cash.

In an inner doc, Monsanto advised its gross sales groups to goal growers that weren’t involved in dicamba and dicamba-resistant crops. The gross sales pitch? Purchasing Monsanto’s merchandise would shield them from their neighbors.

In April 2017, a market analysis doc ready by Bank of America discovered many farmers had been doing simply that.

“Interesting assessment that much of the Xtend acreage was planted to protect themselves from neighbors who might be using dicamba? Gotta admit I would not have expected this in a market research document,” a Monsanto govt wrote.

In inner slides from a September 2016 assembly, BASF recognized “defensive planting” as a possible market alternative. BASF additionally had a market analysis doc that discovered defensive planting was driving gross sales.

However, a “tough questions” memo distributed to BASF workers in November 2017 advised workers the other: “We have not considered ‘defensive planting’ in our sales projections.”

Even as hundreds of farms throughout hundreds of thousands of acres of cropland had been being broken, Monsanto officers had been touting the injury as a gross sales alternative.

“I think we can significantly grow business and have a positive effect on the outcome of 2017 if we reach out to all the driftee people,” one other Monsanto gross sales worker wrote in an electronic mail that yr.

“This is the first product in American history that literally destroys the competition. “You buy it or else.” – Billy Randles, lawyer for Bill Bader

One of these clients was Bill Bader, the peach farmer who sued Monsanto for destroying his orchard. Bader testified that whereas he couldn’t shield his peach timber, in 2019, he planted dicamba-tolerant soybeans to assist shield his soybean crops from getting broken.

“This is the first product in American history that literally destroys the competition,” Bader’s lawyer, Billy Randles, mentioned. “You buy it or else.”

Research Designed to Downplay Harm

For years, the EPA advised Monsanto it wanted to handle volatility in its dicamba research when making use of for regulatory approval. But the assessments Monsanto carried out didn’t mirror real-world situations.

Dicamba would primarily be sprayed on soybeans. But 2015 research submitted to the EPA had been carried out at a cotton subject in Texas and a dust subject in Georgia. Neither state has a considerable amount of soybeans. This steering adopted directives from Monsanto lobbyists that integrated earlier Monsanto analysis displaying that increased volatility was detected on fields with soybeans.

In addition, Monsanto didn’t comply with the foundations that might ultimately be codified on the label.

During the testing in Texas, wind speeds had been 1.9 to four.9 miles per hour. In Georgia, wind speeds had been 1.5 to three miles per hour. According to the label, the EPA-approved dicamba can solely be sprayed with wind speeds between three and 10 miles per hour. Spraying at low wind speeds is extra possible to lead to volatilization as a result of there’s elevated danger of a temperature inversion, which is when cooler air is caught beneath a layer of hotter air, making gases extra possible to persist close to the bottom.

After Monsanto submitted the assessments to the EPA, the corporate nonetheless had quite a lot of unknowns about its product’s volatility, in accordance to inner emails.

A Monsanto researcher wrote an electronic mail in February 2016 to his coworkers that underscored how little the corporate knew concerning the propensity of dicamba to injury crops.

“We don’t know how long a sensitive plant needs in a natural setting to show volatility damage. We don’t know what concentration in the air causes a response, either,” he wrote. “There is a big difference for plants exposed to dicamba vapor for 24 vs 48 hours. Be careful using this externally.”

Despite the design of the research, and the EPA’s personal research that confirmed dicamba posed a danger to 322 protected species of animals and crops, the company conditionally accredited the herbicide in 2016. The company decided that mitigation measures — similar to not spraying close to specialty crops and endangered species habitats, wind pace restrictions, and a ban on aerial purposes — would hold spray droplets on goal.

It was solely accredited for 2 years, when the company would overview its approval once more.

BASF Knew the New Dicamba Was Risky

basf research facility signage outside building
A BASF analysis farm close to Seymour, Illinois, on Dec. three, 2020. BASF launched Engenia, a low volatility formulation of dicamba, starting in 2017. Midwest Center for Investigative Reporting.

After the conditional approval, BASF knew dicamba nonetheless posed dangers. While BASF advised farmers dicamba drift wouldn’t harm their backside strains, the corporate privately advised pesticide applicators that any drift they brought on may lower farmers’ harvests, in accordance to inner BASF paperwork. A BASF govt mentioned, “from a practical standpoint,” Engenia was not totally different from older dicamba variations.

Even Monsanto’s gross sales groups had been having issues with dicamba’s popularity after the EPA accredited the weed killer.

In an inner electronic mail, a Monsanto salesman took situation with BASF altering the way it publicly mentioned its dicamba product: It used to say volatility was not an issue, however now it mentioned it was. Another chemical firm saying volatility was dangerous may harm Monsanto’s gross sales.

“We need to get on this right now!” the salesperson emailed his colleagues. “deny! Deny! DENY!”

‘Never Admit Guilt’

In 2017, the primary season that the brand new variations of dicamba had been accredited, injury reached unprecedented ranges. Around three.6 million acres of soybeans had been broken, in accordance to an estimate from the University of Missouri.

In July of that yr, Monsanto executives scheduled a gathering to focus on how to fight protection of complaints.

“We need REAL scientific support for our product to counteract the supposition happening in the market today,” a Monsanto govt wrote in an electronic mail. “To be frank, dealers and growers are losing confidence in Xtendimax.”

map of damaged soybean acreage from dicamba
Estimates of dicamba-injured soybean acreage as reported by state extension weed scientists as of October 15, 2017. This map was created by Prof. Kevin Bradley on the University of Missouri. Midwest Center for Investigative Reporting.

“I was always told to never admit guilt.” – BASF govt

In late summer time 2017, Monsanto had began to blame injury on a BASF weed killer, which is used on the primary competitor to Monsanto’s personal soybeans. In December 2017, Monsanto agreed to drop that argument as a part of a protection technique with BASF in opposition to farmers.

Both Monsanto and BASF took steps to defend themselves from lawsuits.

The type Monsanto advised its investigators to use when inspecting farmer complaints was “developed to gather data that could defend Monsanto,” in accordance to an inner firm presentation. Later, Monsanto mentioned that 91% of applicators utilizing the shape self-reported errors in spraying dicamba.

A BASF govt additionally edited his firm’s drift investigation Q&A.

“I was always told to never admit guilt,” he mentioned.

On high of the investigations, the label left pesticide applicators answerable for injury as a result of it was practically unattainable to comply with. A 2017 survey of applicators discovered that the majority skilled sprayers had points with dicamba even when spraying in good situations and whereas following the label.

With injury being reported in 2017, Monsanto additionally declined to pursue a research that might have given the corporate extra details about how dicamba brought on injury on actual farms. A Monsanto off-target motion researcher despatched a request for a challenge proposal to Exponent, which helped analyze the information Monsanto submitted to the EPA. The research could possibly be executed in lower than two weeks and value $6,000.

The researcher forwarded the proposal to two Monsanto executives.

The firm by no means acted on it, one testified within the trial.

‘The Problems Have Not Gone Away’

In order to fight the injury, the EPA developed new restrictions on dicamba. In doing so, the EPA dropped an concept that Monsanto opposed, and Monsanto dictated the brand new restrictions that had been adopted.

State officers warned the EPA the modifications wouldn’t work. They had been proper. In 2018, at the very least four.1 million acres had been broken, in accordance to EPA paperwork.

Still, the EPA reapproved dicamba for the 2019 and 2020 rising seasons with new restrictions, a few of which ignored company scientists’ suggestions.

States additionally more and more took measures into their very own arms, implementing spraying deadlines and temperature restrictions.

The injury continued. Illinois, the nation’s largest soybean producing state, had extra complaints than ever in 2019. Iowa had “landscape level” injury in 2020.

Aaron Hager, an affiliate professor of weed science on the University of Illinois, mentioned it’s clear the modifications haven’t labored.

“We have revised the label and revised it again,” Hager mentioned. “The problems have not gone away.”

The EPA’s resolution was ultimately voided by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals for failing to correctly contemplate the impacts on farmers and the surroundings. The courtroom dominated the company gave an excessive amount of deference to Bayer and in addition was missing essential knowledge to present an excessive amount of hurt wouldn’t be executed.

Dicamba was lately reapproved, and Bayer continues to spend money on it. The firm will launch new soybean seeds designed to be resistant to dicamba and glufosinate, one other BASF herbicide, to fill 20 million acres in 2021. The firm additionally continues to work towards approval of different seeds which are resistant to dicamba and different herbicides.

Glazik, the natural Illinois soybean farmer, works as a crops marketing consultant advising different farmers on what to plant. As the injury has continued, he mentioned, an increasing number of of his purchasers are “feeling bullied into” shopping for the dicamba-tolerant crops. Others inform him they’ve to spray dicamba, or else they will’t management the weeds.

But as an natural farmer, Glazik mentioned, no single herbicide is important. Instead, farmers have a selection. Well-managed fields may be weed-free with out utilizing poisonous chemical compounds, he mentioned.

“You don’t have to have the dicamba spray to control weeds in a field,” he mentioned.

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The Midwest Center for Investigative Reporting is a nonprofit, on-line newsroom providing investigative and enterprise protection of agribusiness, Big Ag and associated points via knowledge evaluation, visualizations, in-depth studies, and interactive net instruments. Visit us on-line at www.investigatemidwest.org.

Tell us within the feedback:

  • Were you conscious of the widespread utilization and issues with dicamba?
  • What do you consider Monsanto and BASF’s responses to the injury they’ve brought on?
  • How do you management weeds when rising meals — with out using dangerous chemical compounds?

Featured picture: Midwest Center for Investigative Reporting

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